Two Thirds of Every Year: The Screen Rule Behind a Tiny Film's Long Run
A production of 250,000 yuan with 0.1 percent of national screens stayed in cinemas for three months. Behind that improbable run sits a legal floor most audiences have never heard of: two thirds of every year's screening time, reserved by law, for films made in the country that produced them.
In late October 2026, Niu Lai was still on schedules in Chinese cinemas, close to three months after it opened, with a share of national screenings under 0.1 percent and daily takings in the tens of thousands of yuan. A run like that is usually described as an odd commercial habit, a producer unwilling to leave a screen while a few buyers remain. In China the habit rests on something firmer than habit. Chinese exhibition is regulated around a floor: cinemas are required to give at least two thirds of their annual screening time to films made inside the country. No other major market writes that guarantee into its film law.
A floor written into law
Two separate instruments state the rule, and their wording differs in a way that matters. The Film Industry Regulation, the administrative framework that has governed the market since 2001, closes its exhibition chapter with a short clause: cinemas must screen domestic films, and the annual screening time devoted to domestic films may not fall below two thirds of the total annual screening time of all films. The Film Industry Promotion Law, adopted in November 2016 and in force since March 2017, states the same threshold in more operational terms. Article 29 requires cinemas to arrange the showings and the time slots of films produced by domestic legal persons and other organizations in a reasonable way, and sets the screening time of such films at no less than two thirds of the total annual screening time.
Read the unit carefully, because it is the part that escapes most coverage. The floor is measured in hours of projection rather than in number of showings or in money. A ninety-minute feature contributes ninety minutes toward the ratio each time it plays, while a feature of two hours contributes twice as much for the same slot on the schedule. The floor is also annual and collective. It is a promise about the category of domestic films, not a guarantee attached to any one title. No exhibitor is obliged to give a specific film a single date.
The distinction between a collective floor and an individual guarantee is the difference between a rule that shapes the whole market and a rule that shapes one release. It is the kind of wording that usually gets quoted and then dropped, which is why the two thirds figure is almost unknown outside China even though it constrains every cinema in the country on every calendar year.
Why a floor changes the odds for a small title
A guaranteed share of hours does not manufacture an audience. What it does is remove one of the two ways a film can die. Without any floor, a title that fails to draw crowds is removed quickly, because every empty seat costs the exhibitor money in rent, staffing and power, and the alternative is scheduling something with a known demand curve. With a floor, a large part of the exhibition year has to be filled by domestic films whether or not any particular domestic film is popular. The supply of hours reserved for home grown titles is fixed by law, and the number of films competing for those hours is comparatively small.
For a production of about 250,000 yuan made without a marketing budget, that structural position is worth more than it looks. Niu Lai had neither an advertising campaign to protect nor an opening-day positioning to defend, so the only place its value could be realized was in scheduling. The statutory floor meant a domestic title of any kind could be placed on a date without an exhibitor having to justify the decision against a guaranteed alternative. It also explains the shape of the run in late October, when the film was still on a small number of schedules three months after release, with daily grosses that would not justify those dates on demand alone.
Whether those extra dates were worth the goodwill they cost is a separate argument, and one that some viewers made forcefully at the time, describing the pursuit of residual ticket sales as hard to watch. Their case has support in the structure itself. A floor that reserves hours for domestic cinema does not distinguish between a title with a devoted audience and a title with an empty room. It protects the category, which means it protects the weak members of the category too, and the protection arrives as screen time rather than as revenue.
The other half of the same balance
The domestic floor is half of a system, and the other half is a ceiling on imports, written into a different set of instruments.
The import side started small. From 1995 the state permitted ten revenue sharing foreign titles a year, a figure raised to twenty when China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. In 2004 a further rule required at least six of those twenty revenue sharing slots to be non-American titles, with American films capped at fourteen. In February 2012 a memorandum between the two governments raised the revenue sharing quota from twenty to thirty-four, restricted the fourteen added slots to 3D and IMAX presentations, and lifted the foreign share of box office revenue from 13 percent to 25 percent. A separate category of imported titles, sold outright rather than sharing revenue, added roughly thirty to forty films a year, and the number of revenue sharing titles actually released overtook the nominal quota in 2016 and 2017, when 38 and 39 titles reached Chinese screens.
Imported films have taken roughly a fifth of the national box office in recent years, close to 10.7 billion yuan in 2025. That share is the visible outcome of a managed balance: a floor for domestic hours, a capped number of foreign titles with a preferential lane for American studio films, and an open category of outright sales that fills the rest. A tiny domestic film lives inside that balance without having any direct claim on any part of it, yet the balance is the reason a slot was available for it at all.
How other markets draw the same line
France writes a ceiling instead of a floor. In first run theaters, films that are neither French nor European are capped at about 40 percent of screens, a rule born from the cultural exception France insisted on during the 1993 Uruguay round of trade talks and later carried into the wider European framework, where French films take about 40 percent and European films about 20 percent. South Korea wrote a floor for decades. Requirements that cinemas program domestic films for a set number of days a year appeared in the law of the 1960s, later rose to 146 days per hall, and were relaxed in stages, with a 106 day floor and eventually a cut to 73 days in 2006 under pressure from the United States. With domestic output now running at more than eighty films a year, the remaining requirement is easily met. Brazil went further and made the obligation enforceable: the screen quota introduced in 1991 alongside the Rouanet law was upheld by the Supreme Federal Court in March 2021, ten votes to one, with the justices reasoning that national cinema cannot be produced and shown without a protected place in the exhibition schedule.
The United States takes the opposite approach and writes neither a floor nor a ceiling. Screens there are allocated by booking decisions alone. A mainstream release opens through saturation booking into thousands of venues, typically 2,500 or more and often above 4,000, and the trade treats anything beyond 600 screens as wide. Smaller titles start on platform releases of fewer than 100 screens, while the older first run system assigned new pictures a limited number of screens per market and then let them work down through tiers of prices and neighborhoods over months. Nothing in that arrangement guarantees a film a place.
What the floor does not settle
Two objections deserve equal weight. The first is that a statutory floor subsidizes mediocrity by keeping marginal domestic films on screens where audience choice would have removed them, and every hour given to a weak title is an hour away from a strong one, domestic or foreign. The second is that the same rule is the only reason films like Niu Lai could reach a national audience at all, because without a reserved share of hours a self funded production with no marketing budget would have reached a handful of rooms and disappeared before the word of mouth that saved it could form. Both statements are true of the same clause, and readers who take only one of them will misread the market.
There is also a question of principle. A screen quota is a protectionist instrument, and the markets that use them tend to defend them as cultural policy, which is how France, Korea and Brazil have all framed them. The Brazilian Supreme Court put the trade off directly in 2021, holding that expanding the supply of national films is pointless if the consumption chain has no sensitivity to the product, and treating the quota as a form of state support rather than interference. A country can reasonably ask whether a rule written to protect a national cinema ends up protecting films from its own audiences.
The number worth watching
When a Chinese film's screen time is counted, two figures sit behind the number that reaches the public: how many people came, and how many hours the law had already promised the film's category. For a production of about 250,000 yuan and a cumulative gross near 64 million yuan over 61 days, Niu Lai was a case where the second figure did quiet work for months while the first was scattered across thousands of small, ordinary nights. The next time a tiny film looks improbable on a schedule sheet, the more useful question is what the schedule sheet has to obey.